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INTRODUCTION
The Northwestern University Law Review’s 2017 Symposium: “A Fear
of Too Much Justice”? asked whether McCleskey v. Kemp1 “closed the door
on the ability of the social sciences to meaningfully contribute to Equal
Protection deliberations.”2 One straightforward response is yes: McCleskey
rendered statistical evidence of racial disparities doctrinally irrelevant in the
equal protection context.3 Although understandable, this account overstates
the degree to which McCleskey has constrained the Supreme Court’s
engagement with social science and, more specifically, its treatment of
statistical evidence of racial disparities.
Roughly fifteen years after McCleskey, in Grutter v. Bollinger, Chief
Justice William Rehnquist—himself part of the McCleskey majority—
proffered statistical evidence as dispositive proof that the University of
Michigan Law School had unconstitutionally discriminated against white
1
481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987) (rejecting an equal protection claim that was based on statistical racial
disparities).
2
The Northwestern University Law Review 2017 Symposium: “A Fear of Too Much Justice”?:
Equal Protection and the Social Sciences 30 Years After McCleskey v. Kemp, NW. U. L. REV.,
http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/symposium [https://perma.cc/J9BM-2V32].
3
See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Reflections on the “Inevitability” of Racial Discrimination in
Capital Sentencing and the “Impossibility” of Its Prevention, Detection, and Correction, 51 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 359, 374 (1994) (“The decision has eliminated the federal courts as a forum for the
consideration of statistically based claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing.”). Statistical
evidence of systemic disparate treatment remains probative of unlawful conduct under statutory regimes
such as Title VII. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 387 (1986) (per curiam) (reversing lower
court’s holding that regression analyses “were unacceptable as evidence of discrimination”); see Noah D.
Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1387–92 (2017) (describing
Title VII systemic disparate treatment claims).
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applicants.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Grutter offers one notable
example, but it reflects a broader practice, post-McCleskey, of Justices
mobilizing “social science”5 to support or contest claims of unconstitutional
discrimination.6
The Court’s continued interest in social science invites the following
reframing of the Symposium’s driving inquiry: Why does a judge mobilize
social science in one instance, yet denounce it in another?7 To interrogate
this question, and in the spirit of “eCRT,”8 we propose an approach that weds
social science and Critical Race Theory (CRT). After first anchoring to core
CRT insights, we add analytical texture by drawing on well-established
scholarship from the field of motivated social cognition, which has
illuminated the subjective yet subconscious ways in which humans adopt and
maintain personal beliefs to satisfy psychological needs or goals.9 This
4
See 539 U.S. 306, 378–87 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Petitioner may use these statistics
to expose this sham, which is the basis for the Law School’s admission of less qualified underrepresented
minorities in preference to her. Surely strict scrutiny cannot permit these sorts of disparities without at
least some explanation.”).
5
In this Essay, we use “social science” to broadly encompass all empirical research methods, whether
quantitative or qualitative.
6
See, e.g., Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212 (2016) (citing quantitative and qualitative evidence
that racial diversity has pedagogical benefits); Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2431 (2013) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (invoking research to suggest that affirmative action harms its beneficiaries who become
“mis-match[ed]” at elite institutions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (invoking amici briefs describing research
on the pedagogical benefits of racial diversity); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11
(1954) (citing psychology studies to support the contention that segregated schooling harmed AfricanAmerican children). Social science has figured beyond the equal protection context. This includes, for
instance, the Supreme Court’s adjudication of Eighth Amendment claims brought on behalf of juveniles
sentenced to life without parole. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012) (noting that
the Court’s prior decisions relied on social science). Early twentieth-century citizenship cases reveal how
the Court has selectively utilized social science to police the boundaries of Whiteness. See, e.g., United
States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1923); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922). See
generally Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. I LL. L. REV. 819 (2002) (analyzing trends in the way
courts have used empirical research over time).
7
By engaging this particular question, we are not suggesting that McCleskey is doctrinally or
practically irrelevant vis-à-vis the role of social science in the equal protection context. McCleskey has
and will continue to matter—for instance, by preventing capital defendants from contesting their
sentences with inferential statistics revealing systemic racially disparate treatment. Nor should we forget
that the state of Georgia executed Warren McCleskey on September 25, 1991. See Peter Applebome,
Georgia Inmate Is Executed After ‘Chaotic’ Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/26/us/georgia-inmate-is-executed-after-chaotic-legal-move.html
[https://perma.cc/8ZLE-FBAX].
8
“eCRT” refers to a theoretical approach that intentionally engages and interrogates the intersections
of empirical social science and CRT. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race
Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2014) (exploring the prospects of a
collaboration between CRT and social science).
9
E.g., John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 339 (2003) (meta-analysis identifying psychological variables that predict political conservatism).
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interdisciplinary approach situates the analysis at the intersections of
complex societal structures and forces (e.g., legal doctrine, media
representations, and existing racial disparities) and individual decisionmaking (e.g., judicial engagement with social science).
From this point of departure, we narrow our analysis by introducing a
model that outlines how socially salient stereotypes that privilege and center
Whiteness and ostensibly neutral biases and heuristics intersect to rationalize
the underrepresentation of African-American students in colleges and
universities. If left unchecked, these intersecting forces will predictably and
systematically lead judges to show greater deference to statistical evidence
that aligns with, and perpetuates, prevailing lay theories that explain racial
disparities not as a product of discrimination, but rather as a consequence of
neutral and natural market forces.
I.

DOCTRINE’S UNDER-DETERMINACY: MCCLESKEY V. GRUTTER
A. Rejecting Statistical Disparities (in McCleskey)

In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected Warren McCleskey’s claim that
systemic racial discrimination in Georgia’s capital punishment regime
rendered his death sentence unconstitutional.10 To advance his claim,
McCleskey relied principally on the “Baldus study,” which “purport[ed] to
show a disparity in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on
the race of the murder victim and, to a lesser extent, the race of the
defendant.”11 The Baldus study comprised “two sophisticated statistical
studies” that analyzed over 2,000 Georgia murder cases from the 1970s.12
These studies accounted for “230 variables that could have explained the
disparities on nonracial grounds,” and suggested that the race of the
defendant and the victim had a statistically significant impact on whether a
defendant received a death sentence.13

10
11
12
13

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–92 (1987).
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 287.
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The Court determined that the Baldus study was insufficient to support
McCleskey’s constitutional claim.14 According to the Court,15 a defendant
asserting an equal protection violation must (a) establish the existence of
“purposeful discrimination”16 and (b) causally link this “purposeful
discrimination” to their individual case.17 The Baldus Study was insufficient
because it “offer[ed] no evidence specific to [McCleskey’s] own case that
would support an inference that racial considerations played a part in his
sentence.”18 In effect, the Court rendered the study irrelevant because it did
not directly link a prohibited mental state (“purposeful discrimination”) to
the decision-makers (a jury) who determined McCleskey’s sentence.
The Court tethered this doctrinal argument to normative policy
concerns. For instance, the Court noted that were the Baldus study sufficient
to establish an equal protection violation, it would have rendered
constitutionally suspect Georgia’s entire capital punishment regime.19 In
14

Id. at 292–306 (rejecting the equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims). This outcome was
not preordained by precedent, as existing case law had permitted statistical disparities to establish
discriminatory intent. Id. at 293 (“The Court has accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in
certain limited contexts.”); see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 501 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (“The statistical evidence, then, at the very least supports an inference that MexicanAmericans were discriminated against in the choice of grand jurors.”). The Court, however, distinguished
this precedent from the capital sentencing context. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294–97.
15
The Court did not dispute that the Baldus study supported an inference of systemic discrimination
endemic to Georgia’s criminal justice system. To the contrary, Justice Antonin Scalia’s posthumously
released conference memorandum revealed that he appreciated the prevalence of racial bias. See
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Antonin Scalia (Jan. 6, 1987) (located in Justice Powell’s
McCleskey v. Kemp Case File on file with Washington & Lee University School of Law Library at 148),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/8G5R-FK56] (“Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is
real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot honestly say that all I need is
more proof.”).
16
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (“Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who
alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving ‘the existence of purposeful
discrimination.’” (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967))). For an extensive critique of
the Court’s evolving use of “purposeful discrimination” in the equal protection context, see Ian HaneyLópez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 (2012).
17
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”).
18
Id. at 292–93.
19
Id. (“In its broadest form, McCleskey’s claim of discrimination extends to every actor in the
Georgia capital sentencing process, from the prosecutor who sought the death penalty and the jury that
imposed the sentence, to the State itself that enacted the capital punishment statute and allows it to remain
in effect despite its allegedly discriminatory application. . . . McCleskey’s claim that these statistics are
sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular case, would extend to all
capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant is black.”). This reasoning
inspired Justice William Brennan’s now-famous rhetorical response that the majority exhibited “a fear of
too much justice.” Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court next states that its unwillingness to
regard petitioner’s evidence as sufficient is based in part on the fear that recognition of McCleskey’s
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other words, doctrinally legitimating the Baldus study would have risked
destabilizing fundamental sites of state power in Georgia and beyond.20 This
anxiety was not foreign to the McCleskey majority; similar concerns had
animated the Court’s rejection of disparate impact theory in the
constitutional context only a decade earlier.21
B. Invoking Statistical Disparities (in Grutter)
McCleskey reflects a Court hostile to claims of unconstitutional race
discrimination predicated on statistical evidence of racial disparities. Yet
roughly fifteen years later, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had joined the
McCleskey majority, employed evidence of racial disparities to support his
conclusion that the University of Michigan Law School unconstitutionally
discriminated against white applicants in its admission procedures.22
In 1997, Barbara Grutter sued the University of Michigan Law School
after it had rejected her application the previous year.23 The law school
utilized a “highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file” that
permitted the consideration of an applicant’s race.24 Grutter argued that the
policy unconstitutionally discriminated against her in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.25 The Court rejected her claim, concluding that the
law school’s policy was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest of
student body diversity.26
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused much of his opinion on six
years of the law school’s admissions data spanning from 1995 through
claim would open the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing. Taken on its
face, such a statement seems to suggest a fear of too much justice.” (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted)).
20
This disruption likely would have extended beyond Georgia. See Rook v. Rice, 478 U.S. 1040,
1040 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[Petitioner] contends that newly available social science evidence
demonstrates unconstitutional, system-wide racial disparities in North Carolina’s capital sentencing
system. . . . Other petitioners have presented similar claims of system-wide racial disparities in capital
sentencing and have requested stays of execution from this Court in light of our grants of certiorari in
McCleskey and Hitchcock.”).
21
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (expressing concern that a disparate impact
cause of action “would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax,
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white”); see also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (2011); Elise C. Boddie,
Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2016).
22
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 381–87 (Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting). Justice Scalia, who
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent, was also a member of the McCleskey majority.
23
Id. at 316.
24
Id. at 337.
25
Id. at 317 (Grutter also alleged that the law school violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
26
Id. at 334–35.
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2000.27 After first comparing the percentages of applicants and admittees by
race, 28 Chief Justice Rehnquist highlighted that in the 2000 admissions cycle,
the Law School admitted a higher percentage of African-Americans who fell
within certain LSAT and GPA ranges than Hispanics who fell into those
same ranges.29
According to the Chief Justice, these statistics “ha[d] a significant
bearing on petitioner’s case” by “expos[ing]” that the Law School
impermissibly considered race during its admissions process.30 The
correlation between the percentages of African-American, Hispanic, and
Native American applicants and admittees was, in the Chief Justice’s view,
“far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of” constitutionally
permissible behavior.31 To the contrary, he concluded, the “tight correlation
between the percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race . . . must
result from careful race based planning by the Law School.”32
C. Identifying Inconsistencies
We highlight Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent not to debate,
on the merits, his reliance on admissions data. Nor do we mean to suggest
that Grutter and McCleskey present factual analogues. Nonetheless, we
highlight the Chief Justice’s dissent because his treatment of data in Grutter
appears facially irreconcilable with the majority’s denouncement of the
Baldus study in McCleskey. Multiple distinctions across these two opinions
deserve mention.
First, the data. The admissions statistics in Grutter constituted
“descriptive statistics”33—that is, raw numbers, averages, and percentages
that describe a population (here, law school applicants and admittees).
Importantly, descriptive statistics do not permit conclusions beyond the

27
Id. at 381–86 & tbls.1, 2 & 3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist did not discuss
data regarding white and Asian applicants and admittees. Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 382 (“[I]n 2000, 12 Hispanics who scored between a 159–160 on the LSAT and earned a
GPA of 3.00 or higher applied for admission and only 2 were admitted. Meanwhile, 12 AfricanAmericans in the same range of qualifications applied for admission and all 12 were admitted. Likewise,
that same year, 16 Hispanics who scored between a 151–153 on the LSAT and earned a 3.00 or higher
applied for admission and only 1 of those applicants was admitted. Twenty-three similarly qualified
African-Americans applied for admission and 14 were admitted.” (internal citations omitted)).
30
Id. at 382–83.
31
Id. at 383.
32
Id. at 385.
33
Descriptive statistics report and describe quantitative information. See JERROLD H. ZAR,
BIOSTATISTICAL ANALYSIS 22–35 (5th ed. 2009).
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statistics themselves.34 The admissions data—although in certain ways
revealing35—were therefore of limited use to answer, for instance, whether
and to what extent race was a causal factor in the law school’s admissions
process generally, and whether race could be causally linked to Barbara
Grutter’s personal rejection.36 Additional statistical analyses would have
been required to answer such questions.
In McCleskey, by contrast, the Baldus study consisted of “inferential
statistics,” which use samples of data to draw broader inferences about a
population.37 Thus, the Baldus study was competent to make a supportable
claim, in ways that the descriptive statistics in Grutter could not, that
systemic racially disparate treatment pervaded Georgia’s capital punishment
regime.38
Second, the doctrine. In McCleskey, the Court required evidence that
causally linked a particular mental state (purposeful discrimination) to the
alleged harm (McCleskey’s sentence). The Baldus study, which could not
causally establish that McCleskey’s sentence was the product of purposeful
discrimination, was rendered doctrinally irrelevant.39
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist never suggested that Grutter’s
discrimination claim required causal proof that the law school rejected her—
consciously or otherwise—because she was white.40 Even if such causal
34
See John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil,
7 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 13 n.38 (2010) (“Perceived differences based on percentages are misleading.
What may seem different at first glance may actually have a high amount of variability within and among
the data. Therefore, a difference seen between two different factors may not actually be a real statistical
difference. This is the main difference between descriptive statistics and inferential or inductive statistics.
Descriptive statistics allow for an overall quantitative picture of the data. Inferential statistics allow testing
of inferential relationships among data.” (citing ZAR, supra note 33, at 22–35)).
35
We are not suggesting that descriptive statistics are never probative of unconstitutional
discrimination. Nonetheless, judges should take care not to read too much into, or draw unwarranted
empirical conclusions from, descriptive statistics.
36
There is no indication that the admissions data were subjected to any statistical analyses that, like
the Baldus study, controlled for nonracial factors relevant to the admissions process.
37
See generally A.F. HAYES, INTRODUCTION TO MEDIATION, MODERATION, AND CONDITIONAL
PROCESS ANALYSIS: A REGRESSION-BASED APPROACH (2013) (explaining the concept whereby studies
of a small group are used to infer conclusions about larger populations). See also McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 287–92, 287 n.5, 288 n.6, 291 n.7 (1987).
38
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287–92, 287 n.5, 288 n.6, 291 n.7.
39
Id. at 297 (“Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory purpose.”).
40
Nor did the majority. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–44 (2003) (no discussion of
causation requirements). The fact that a university permits the consideration of race in its admissions
process does not establish that the institution took a particular applicant’s race into account, or whether—
even if it had—the applicant would have been admitted but for her or his race. The Court’s treatment of
causation in Grutter avoids this reality by drawing on precedent that links constitutional standing and
causation to the plaintiff’s right to compete, not the denial of admission (which the plaintiff may not have
obtained even under a formally colorblind regime). See id. at 317 (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated
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evidence had been required, the descriptive statistics likely would have
satisfied the Chief Justice, who appeared to conclude that the admissions data
proved causation and unconstitutional discrimination in Grutter’s individual
case: “[Grutter] may use these statistics to expose this sham, which is the
basis for the Law School’s admission of less qualified underrepresented
minorities in preference to her.”41
Third, the presumptions. The McCleskey majority muted the Baldus
study’s probative value, in part, by noting that a nonracial reason explained
McCleskey’s sentence: McCleskey had committed a crime that was
punishable by death.42 In so stating, the Court subordinated McCleskey’s
discrimination theory to other, more “plausible” explanations. The reverse
occurred in Grutter, where Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to presume
racial discrimination and subordinate alternative explanations. He never, for
instance, questioned whether something other than race caused Grutter’s
rejection (for instance, that the law school had rejected Grutter because she
was less qualified than other applicants).43
McCleskey and Grutter involved different factual circumstances and
distinct types of statistical evidence of discrimination.44 These distinctions
do not, however, support the disparate ways in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist (and Justice Antonin Scalia) engaged data across the two cases.
Given this disparate treatment of data, these two opinions appear
inconsistent. We would argue, however, that when viewed within the context
of salient lay theories about discrimination and racial disparities in American
society, the facially disparate treatment of data in McCleskey and Grutter
Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“The ‘injury in fact’ in an
equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the
barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.”)).
41
Id. at 382–83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the admissions data “reflect[] a
consistent practice” that had a “significant bearing on petitioner’s case” and that “[t]hese different
numbers, moreover, come only as a result of substantially different treatment among the three
underrepresented minority groups . . . .”).
42
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296–97 (“Moreover, absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary to
seek such a rebuttal, because a legitimate and unchallenged explanation for the decision is apparent from
the record: McCleskey committed an act for which the United States Constitution and Georgia laws
permit imposition of the death penalty.”).
43
To presume that Grutter was undeservedly rejected because of race requires the corresponding
assumption that the law school admitted undeserving students of color. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 385
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“It suggests a formula for admission based on the aspirational assumption
that all applicants are equally qualified academically, and therefore that the proportion of each group
admitted should be the same as the proportion of that group in the applicant pool.”). In a sense, Chief
Justice Rehnquist seems to suggest that were admissions markets functioning without racial
discrimination, students of color would be appropriately underrepresented.
44
One final inconsistency deserves mention: the stakes. Grutter involved admission to the University
of Michigan Law School. Without doubt, entry into a competitive and elite institution of higher education
is a coveted prize. But in McCleskey, life literally was on the line (and subsequently taken by the State).
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reappear more harmonious than divergent.45 To unpack this harmony, we
now turn to CRT and complementary social science to explore why judges
leverage statistical evidence of discrimination in some cases, yet reject it in
others.
II. BLIND MOTIVATION
So what explains why judges accept social science data in some
instances and reject it in others? A “legal realist”46 might posit that Justices
are simply ends-oriented. Doctrine cabins discretion, but Justices remain
rational actors who consciously and selectively cite evidence to reach a
desired and predetermined outcome.47 The legal realist narrative is attractive;
it disrupts deterministic accounts of the law and legal reasoning that fetishize
doctrine as stable, inevitable, and detached from judges themselves.
We believe, however, that such an account is lacking in at least two
respects. First, in ways familiar to contemporary equal protection
jurisprudence, it overly privileges a judge’s conscious and deliberate intent.
In so doing, it discounts the degree to which automatic and unconscious
mental processes—biases and heuristics—can impact judicial decisionmaking. Second, it is inattentive to how ostensibly neutral biases and
heuristics, when situated within societal structures and forces that privilege
Whiteness, can predictably and systematically position judges to overvalue
statistical data that align with prevailing lay theories that explain existing
racial disparities as the product of neutral market forces.
To fill this gap, we adopt an eCRT48 approach that coheres around core
insights from CRT and complementary findings from the motivated social
cognition literature. As a point of departure, CRT can help locate the Court’s
facially inconsistent engagement with social science within a continuum of
45
One could argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s disparate treatment of the data is an appropriate
and principled application of prevailing equal protection doctrine. Even to the extent this is accurate,
which we would contest, equal protection doctrine is not a natural and fixed phenomenon exogenous from
the Justices who inhabit the Court. See Haney-López, supra note 16 (describing the Supreme Court’s
evolving equal protection jurisprudence).
46
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1223 (1931) (“They view rules, they view law, as means to ends; as only means
to ends; as having meaning only insofar as they are means to ends.”).
47
We do not mean to deny that, at times, Justices might deliberately “cherry-pick” social science.
Justices have offered such accounts of their colleagues. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 991 n.6 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But if a court can find an undue burden simply by
selectively string-citing the right social science articles, I do not see the point of emphasizing or requiring
‘detailed factual findings’ in the District Court.” (emphasis added)). Our more basic claim, which we
explore in this Essay, is that the analysis should not focus on conscious intent at the expense of other
causal factors—such as cognitive biases and heuristics.
48
See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 8.
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equal protection retrenchment over the past half century.49 Somewhat more
concretely, a CRT lens illuminates how the underlying logic of McCleskey
and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Grutter dissent fits within a once nascent and
now entrenched “colorblind” constitutionalism.50 This “colorblindness”
invites, and in many ways rationalizes, an equal protection doctrine that has
become more hostile to race-conscious remedies than to race-neutral
practices that reproduce and reify this country’s history of racial
subordination and stratification.51
This foundational CRT frame is well rehearsed and descriptively
compelling. Nonetheless, we believe that room remains to build on
fundamental CRT concepts by wedding the theory to the now wellestablished literature on motivated social cognition.52 This intersectional
approach offers a more textured account of judicial decision-making by
combining a CRT lens mindful of structure and power with empirical
accounts of individual decision-making.53 We proceed in two parts.
First, we discuss the Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice
(JSM), a social-psychological model that can be used to explain how
systems—such as the law—maintain structures of racial hierarchy.54
Although historically siloed within the field of social psychology, JSM
49
In this sense, CRT offers a theoretical frame that situates McCleskey and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Grutter dissent within a constitutional tradition in which the rise of formal equality has proved insufficient
to destabilize the basic racial regime that has defined America since its founding.
50
See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–
7 (1991).
51
Id.
52
There is a body of emerging legal scholarship that draws on social cognition literatures. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Feingold, . . . And Diversity for All, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the social
identity threat and stereotype threat literatures); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2010) (discussing the implicit
bias literature). Scholars have also become increasingly intentional about bridging structural and
individual actor analyses. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545
(2017).
53
Our treatment of CRT and the motivated reasoning literatures is far from exhaustive. Multiple
theories and frameworks from both could add to our analysis. Nonetheless, for purposes of scope, our
primary intent is to demonstrate how integrating these often uncoupled perspectives offers a more
comprehensive lens through which to appreciate the continuities that thread the Court’s seemingly
inconsistent relationship with statistical evidence in the equal protection context.
54
Although prevalent in the social science literature, JSM is effectively absent from legal
scholarship. We have identified only eleven law review articles that mention JSM (based on a Nov. 11,
2017 Westlaw search for “justification /1 suppression”). In the majority of the articles, JSM features as a
footnote. See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235,
2240 & n.26 (2017) (invoking JSM in the context of a discussion on racial anxiety). Beyond JSM, other
complementary theories from the social sciences that remain largely absent from the legal literature
include, inter alia, social dominance theory. One notable exception includes David Simson, Fool Me
Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on You Again: How Disparate Treatment Doctrine
Perpetuates Racial Hierarchy, HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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naturally combines with CRT to provide a more comprehensive account of
the way in which human cognition, as a function of the structures and
societies in which we live, tends to reproduce inequality and racial
stratification.55 Second, using JSM as a bridge, we introduce the “elite
student paradigm,” a theoretical model that illuminates how independent yet
intersecting and reinforcing cognitive biases and heuristics will predictably
and systematically lead judges to defer to evidence (irrespective of its
objective quality) that aligns with prevailing lay theories regarding racial
disparities in American society.
A. The Justification-Suppression Model
Social psychologists have long examined the underpinnings of
prejudice,56 including its origins and manifestations in American society.57 In
an attempt to synthesize the “best known and empirically supported theories
[of prejudice],” Christian Crandall and Amy Eshleman developed the
Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice (JSM).58 This broad theory
posits that everyone possesses “‘genuine’ prejudice,” understood as “pure,
unadulterated, original, unmanaged, and unambivalently negative feelings
toward members of a devalued group.”59 Genuine prejudice, however, is
rarely—if ever—expressed. Rather, internal60 and external61 factors allow
(i.e., justify) or restrict (i.e., suppress) the actual expression of prejudice. The
ultimate expression of prejudice, in turn, is a function of the balance between
available and existing justifiers and suppressors.

55
Many of CRT’s fundamental principles find echoes in social science scholarship, including
concerns about biases, decision-making, and prejudice that span individual and structural accounts of
discrimination. By integrating these literatures, we can build on scholarship that has thickened CRT with
relevant empirical scholarship and buttressed the empirical literature by filtering it through a CRT lens.
See, e.g., Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 8; Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and
Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2013).
56
The term “prejudice” is susceptible to many meanings. For purposes of this Essay, we adopt
Crandall and Eshleman’s definition that “prejudice [is] a negative evaluation of a social group or a
negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual’s group membership.”
Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification–Suppression Model of the Expression and
Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 414 (2003).
57
See generally John Duckitt, Psychology and Prejudice: A Historical Analysis and Integrative
Framework, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 1182 (1992) (reviewing different social psychological approaches to
researching and understanding prejudice).
58
Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56.
59
Id. at 418.
60
Internal factors include, inter alia, personal belief systems or values (e.g., religion) that proscribe
discrimination. See infra Sections II.A–B.
61
External factors include, inter alia, social norms (e.g., against being racist) and public
accountability for transgressing such norms. See id.
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For purposes of this Essay, we focus on the JSM’s conception of a
“justifier,” which Crandall and Eshleman define as “any psychological or
social process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine prejudice
without suffering external or internal sanction.”62 Justifiers function as the
“releasers of prejudice,”63 effectively providing “cover” for otherwise
prejudiced behavior that would garner public rebuke. But justifiers do not
operate solely to rationalize prejudice to an external audience. They also
permit those engaging in prejudiced conduct to maintain an egalitarian
concept of self.
The concept of a justifier effortlessly translates to Supreme Court
jurisprudence. In situations where a decision will predictably be
characterized and contested as racist, prejudiced, or otherwise contrary to
salient egalitarian norms, the Court may mobilize a justifier to defend, mask,
or otherwise rationalize its decision.64 Multiple common justifiers, including
the ostensibly neutral goal of status quo maintenance, visibly operate across
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.65
In McCleskey, for instance, the Court expressly rejected the Baldus
study, in part, because of its potential to disrupt the status quo—specifically,
the capital punishment regime in Georgia and beyond.66 Although more
oblique in Grutter, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s skepticism of the law school’s
admissions policy was predicated, at least in part, on a colorblind vision of
neutrality that associated any departure from the status quo (here, understood
as race-blind admissions) as anathema to equality. In other words, by treating
race-blind admissions as the neutral baseline, the Chief Justice could
predicate on egalitarian norms his hostility to the law school’s race62

Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56, at 425.
Id.
64
Justifiers have a long history in the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (“Regardless of the true nature of the assembly
and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly
connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast
this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were
presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of
hostility to him or his race.”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (“When a man has emerged
from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen,
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be
protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.”).
65
See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56, at 426.
66
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987) (“In its broadest form, McCleskey’s claim
of discrimination extends to every actor in the Georgia capital sentencing process . . . . McCleskey’s
claim that these statistics are sufficient proof of discrimination, without regard to the facts of a particular
case, would extend to all capital cases in Georgia, at least where the victim was white and the defendant
is black.” (emphasis added)); see also supra note 20.
63
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conscious admissions program. Moreover, any racial disparities that flow
from a race-blind admissions regime—even if the product of biased
admissions policies—are explained and rationalized as the product of natural
and neutral market forces.67
Although the “justifier” terminology is foreign to CRT, it aligns with
foundational CRT insights that have illuminated what effectively function as
jurisprudential justifiers across legal doctrine and scholarship.68 These
include, for instance, the way in which proffered commitments to
indeterminate
concepts
such
as
“neutrality,”
“merit,” and
“antidiscrimination,” when situated within a colorblind frame, are employed
to justify a constitutional jurisprudence that maintains racial hierarchy and
reinstantiates racial subordination.69 In the admissions context, for instance,
status quo maintenance can naturalize disparities as the product of neutral
processes such that racial parity requires departing from “fair” and
“meritocratic” standards.
Accordingly, the JSM offers a complementary yet distinct frame that
buttresses CRT by delivering an empirically based model of prejudice and
its manifestation. The JSM also bridges CRT and other dimensions of the
motivated social cognition literature. Specifically, we explore an integrated
approach mindful of the relationship between common biases and heuristics
on the one hand, and socially salient stereotypes on the other. This approach
exposes how ostensibly neutral cognitive processes will predictably and
systematically operate as justifiers that facilitate prejudice in the form of
judicial deference to evidence that reinforces and perpetuates racial
hierarchy in America.
67
See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 56, at 426. For some, fidelity to neutral and natural market
forces is predicated on the notion that “what is, is good.” Id. The act of status quo baselining allows those
who hold prejudices about marginalized groups to wash their hands of any responsibility to change them.
68
For instance, scholars have critiqued opponents of affirmative action for mobilizing “model
minority” rhetoric to deploy Asian-Pacific Americans as “racial mascots” in order to “insulat[e]
themselves from charges of racism.” Robert S. Chang, The Invention of Asian Americans, 3 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 947, 963 (2013) (quoting Sumi Cho, Remarks at the First Annual Asian Pacific American Law
Professors Conference: A Theory of Racial Mascotting (Oct. 14, 1994)); see also Gabriel J. Chin et al.,
Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of Justice, a Policy Analysis of
Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 161 (1996) (noting that opponents of affirmative
action have used Asian Pacific Americans to claim moral authority when advocating regressive policies);
Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of
Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 120 (1998) (“[R]acial redemption theory is available for a wide
range of purposes, including . . . explaining the increasing use of people of color as spokespersons or
‘racial mascots’ for racially regressive policies and reconciling the increasing equality discourse with the
decreasing yield in material resources to redress inequality.”).
69
Translated to contemporary equal protection doctrine, one could characterize as a justifier any
number of theoretical and jurisprudential moves that permit that court to state that the Equal Protection
Clause is as skeptical of racial remedies designed to promote integration as it is with Jim Crow laws that
mandated segregation.
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B. The Perils of Presuming “Fit”
Cognitive biases and heuristics function as mental filters and shortcuts
that help humans quickly and effortlessly process, interpret, and manage
information.70 These automatic and subconscious cognitive processes are
critical. Without them, we could never process the millions (if not billions)
of bits of data we consume every second.71 Although these processes are
beneficial, unchecked reliance on biases and heuristics creates predictable
and systematic judgment errors—for instance, by eliciting lopsided
information search and retrieval—that compromise our ability to engage in
“rational”72 behavior and decision-making. This occurs because biases and
heuristics, as helpful as they are, often entice us to “incorporate the
irrelevant”73 when making decisions, often without us even knowing it.74 Our
decisions and behavior pay the price.
1. Biases and Heuristics
Two common heuristics include the “representativeness heuristic” and
the “availability heuristic.”75 Both are frequently activated when humans
encounter questions of probability. The representativeness heuristic
describes the process in which humans, when assessing the probability that
an object belongs to a category, (over)rely on prototypical objects that one
70

Richard. E. Nisbett et al., The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning,
90 PSYCHOL. REV. 339, 340 (1983) (describing heuristics as “rapid and more or less automatic judgmental
rules of thumb” that allow humans to process the millions of pieces of information we encounter on a
daily basis).
71
See id. (explaining that biases and heuristics help relieve our brains of more menial decisions to
create space for more complex interactions and behaviors); see also C. Neil Macrae et al., Stereotypes as
Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37,
44–45 (1994).
72
An ongoing debate exists in the social sciences about whether biases are rational or irrational.
Cognitive processes that employ rules to help us get to faster, and largely accurate, decisions are
beneficial. However, our decision-making can be swayed, or biased, by any number of factors. When
factors like subtle shifts in the environment or question order materially impact our judgment or decisions,
many would describe this as irrational.
73
See Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors in Judgments
of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (T. Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002).
74
Irrelevant information can come from a variety of sources, including ourselves (e.g., the “how-doI-feel-about-it” heuristic), see Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments
of Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 513, 513 (1983); a speaker’s attributes (e.g., whether they are attractive), see Richard E. Petty
& John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, 19 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 123, 125 (1986); or the sequence of questions, see Norbert Schwarz et al., Assimilation
and Contrast Effects in Part-Whole Question Sequences: A Conversational Logic Analysis, 55 PUB.
OPINION Q. 3, 19 (1991).
75
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124, 1124, 1127 (1974).
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associates with that category.76 In other words, the representativeness
heuristic offers a shortcut (the use of a prototypical case) to assess the “fit”
between an object and a given category.77
To provide a concrete example, consider the following question: Is a
tomato a fruit or a vegetable?78 There are multiple ways to answer this
question, but people frequently draw on prototypical fruits and vegetables,
and then ask with which the tomato is a better fit. If, for you, “fruit” conjures
apple, banana, and grape, while “vegetable” elicits lettuce, carrots, and
cucumber, then tomato likely goes in the vegetable category. Why? Because
a tomato probably does not fit in your fruit salad, but would nicely
complement your vegetable salad. Here, relying on fit alone leads you down
the incorrect path; a tomato is a fruit, not a vegetable.79
The availability heuristic describes the tendency to assess the
probability of an event as a function of how easily the particular outcome
comes to mind.80 Although not inherently problematic, the likelihood of a
given outcome rarely tracks how easily one can imagine the scenario
unfolding. Thus, when an event is particularly salient—regardless of actual
“base rates”—we fail to adjust our mental calculations and overestimate its
likelihood.
For instance, a nervous traveler boarding an airplane may wonder about
the likelihood that her plane will crash. The availability heuristic suggests
that if this person can easily imagine the plane crashing (perhaps because a
recent crash is dominating news headlines), she might conclude that the
likelihood of the plane crashing is quite high. Notwithstanding how easily
the terrifying crash can be imagined, its actual likelihood is minute.81 The
passenger nonetheless remains concerned about a crash throughout the flight.
Automatic mental shortcuts such as the representativeness and
availability heuristics can create the illusion that we have all the information
we need to render a responsible judgment. This illusion can interfere with
76

Id. at 1124.
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction
Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983).
78
Thanks to Victor Quintanilla for suggesting this helpful analogy.
79
Colloquially tomatoes are more commonly understood as vegetables, but this is exactly where the
representativeness heuristic fails us in decision-making. Instead of asking deeper questions about what
assumptions we are making, and weighing the available information (in a way that would require
incorporating our conscious, controlled processing mechanisms), we use the faster shortcut and determine
“good enough.”
80
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 77.
81
Recent statistics from the International Air Transport Association (IATA) reveal that, out of 36.4
million flights in 2013, only 81 accidents occurred, 16 of which were fatal. Press Release, Int’l Air
Transport Ass’n, IATA Releases 2013 Safety Performance – Encouraging Signs for African Safety (Apr.
1, 2014), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2014-04-01-02.aspx [https://perma.cc/YYL8-MM7L].
77
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our motivation to conduct a more thorough information search, even when
one would be prudent. To complicate matters, these heuristics often interact
with other mental processes that undermine “rational” judgment.
Take, for instance, the phenomenon of confirmation bias. To appreciate
how it functions, consider the following riddle.82 We have defined a rule that
all sequences of three numbers must obey. The following sequence of three
numbers obeys our rule: 2 | 4 | 8. Can you identify the rule? You likely have
a working hypothesis. But before answering, consider the following
sequences:
A: 4 | 8 | 16
B: 5 | 7 | 10
C: 3 | 1 | 23
Of these three, which (if any) also obey the rule? Most readers are likely
thinking the following: “It’s A. Obviously, it’s A. The rule is straightforward:
moving left to right, double the preceding number.” That response is
incorrect yet predictably common. A is not the only sequence from the above
list that satisfies the rule. Rather, A and B satisfy the rule, which requires
only that, moving left to right, each number be larger than the one preceding
it.
Surprised? You are not alone.83 Although simple, the exercise activates
the pervasive and common cognitive process known as confirmation bias,
which captures the human tendency to overemphasize information that
supports an initial hypothesis and discount or ignore countervailing
evidence.84 In the foregoing exercise, most participants overvalue A because
it satisfies an initial hypothesis. This occurs at the expense of other available
information and potential hypotheses (that may, as here, also be correct).
The foregoing examples—this riddle, the probability of a plane crash,
classifying a tomato—may seem inconsequential and only tangentially
related to the inquiry motivating this Essay. However, these seemingly
neutral and innocuous processes also impact our judgments about people,
82
The inspiration for this puzzle comes from a 2015 David Leonhardt article. See David Leonhardt,
A Quick Puzzle to Test Your Problem Solving, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/03/upshot/a-quick-puzzle-to-test-your-problemsolving.html [https://perma.cc/467P-642S].
83
We regularly give presentations on biases and heuristics and often employ this exercise. On
multiple occasions, an audience member has rejected our answer, suggested that we were incorrect (that
is, about our rule), or accused us of being unfair.
84
Confirmation bias falls in the category of “positive test strategies.” Joshua Klayman & YoungWon Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211,
225 (1987).
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discrimination, and existing societal inequalities. Often, when they do, it is
in part a function of socially salient stereotypes about relevant social
categories such as race, gender, or age.
2. Stereotypes
Stereotypes refer to attributes or traits associated with a social
category.85 Although sometimes siloed from the broader cognitive biases and
heuristics literature, stereotypes are critical to our analysis of the Justices’
seemingly inconsistent use of social science.86 At one level, cognitive biases
and heuristics exist independent of stereotypes and the broader social,
political, and historical context in which we live.87 However, when it comes
to perceiving individual people and society more broadly, stereotypes
frequently form the substantive content that undergirds cognitive biases and
heuristics and their influence on how we see the world.88 That is, just as
societal forces (such as media portrayals and common discourse) determine
what we “know” as the prototypical fruit, societal forces also impact what
we “know” about the prototypical criminal, student, or surgeon.
Stereotypes have multiple origins. On the one hand, stereotypes arise
from direct experiences—that is, actual interpersonal encounters with
individuals from a particular social group. But stereotypes, particularly as
they operate across social groups,89 are often the product of vicarious
experiences—that is, “simulated engagements with racial others provided
through various forms of the media or narrated by parents and our peers.”90
Regardless of their origin—direct or vicarious experience—stereotypes,
often by informing the operation of cognitive biases and heuristics, influence
our judgments about people.

85

See Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading?: The Princeton
Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1140 (1995).
86
Beyond concerns about racial inequality, biases and heuristics can produce results that many would
find unjust, or problematically vulnerable to subtle environmental changes that are otherwise irrelevant
to the merits of an individual case. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777, 791–94 (2001) (describing how anchoring affected the judgments of magistrate judges).
87
Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 357, 365–66 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
88
Consider, for instance, Jerry Kang’s notion of “racial mechanics.” Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1139–45 (2000); see also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1497–1504 (2005) [hereinafter Kang, Trojan Horses] (describing how “racial mechanics”
operates in part through racial categories into which individuals are placed, and this process triggers
meanings associated with the category, thereby affecting interpersonal interactions).
89
Given racial segregation in contemporary American society, meaningful intergroup contact can be
rare. See Daniel Cox et al., Race, Religion, and Political Affiliation of Americans’ Core Social Networks,
PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Aug. 3, 2016) https://www.prri.org/research/poll-race-religion-politicsamericans-social-networks [https://perma.cc/4FAA-XBBR].
90
See Kang, Trojan Horses, supra note 88, at 1539–40.
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To appreciate the way in which stereotypes interact with otherwise
neutral cognitive processes, consider the findings from John M. Darley and
Paget H. Gross’s 1983 study on the hypothesis-confirming effect of
stereotypes.91 Darley and Gross asked participants to watch a video of
“Hannah,” an elementary school-aged girl, perform a variety of academic
tasks.92 Here’s the twist: although all participants watched the exact same
video, half of the participants were told that Hannah was poor; the other half
were told that she came from a wealthy family.93
Darley and Gross predicted that socially salient stereotypes about class
would impact the participants’ evaluations.94 They were correct. On average,
participants who believed Hannah was wealthy rated her performance across
various criteria higher than did those who believed Hannah was poor.95 Thus,
in the same way that other heuristics encourage people to “incorporate the
irrelevant” into their decisions, so too did participants in the Darley and
Gross study—who unknowingly incorporated information concerning
Hannah’s socioeconomic status, notwithstanding its irrelevance, in a way
that impacted their actual evaluations.
3. The Elite Student Paradigm
Although there has been an observable shift toward egalitarian norms
and commitments, American society remains defined by socially salient
stereotypes and attitudes that privilege and normalize Whiteness.96 We
suggest that these stereotypes serve as a filter through which the
aforementioned biases and heuristics impact real world behavior—
including, for instance, a judge’s engagement with statistical evidence of
discrimination.
Other scholars have previously linked stereotypes and heuristics to
biased judgments and decision-making. In 2012, L. Song Richardson and
Phillip Atiba Goff developed the suspicion heuristic “to explain the
predictable errors in perception, decision-making, and action that can occur

91

See generally John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983) (concluding that some stereotype information
creates falsely confirmed hypotheses about stereotyped individuals).
92
Id. at 23.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 22.
95
Id. at 28.
96
Socially salient stereotypes extend beyond race to include, inter alia, gender, age, religion, ability,
and status. For purposes of scope, we focus on the relationship between biases and heuristics and socially
salient racial stereotypes. We recognize that this one-dimensional analysis is limited, and inevitably tells
an artificially shallow story about the relationship between identities, society, social psychology, and the
law.

1707

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

when individuals make judgments of criminality.”97 The suspicion heuristic
bridged insights from scholarship on heuristics and implicit racial biases to
explain how perceiving race—absent explicit racial prejudice—can
nonetheless bias judgments about criminality.
Building on this concept, Devon W. Carbado and Daria Roithmayr
developed the “black suspicion paradigm,” which offered a more racially
inflected model depicting the many discrete but interacting and intersecting
cognitive processes and social phenomena that contribute to disparate
policing of African-Americans.98 The “black suspicion paradigm”
effectively operates as follows: First, interstitial social forces (e.g., media
representations, public discourse, lay theories about race) produce pervasive
racial stereotypes (linking Black with criminality) and salient images of the
prototypical criminal (the African-American).99 This “racial epistemology”
then produces the “black criminal availability heuristic” and “black criminal
representativeness heuristic,” respectively.100 Although distinct, these coconstitutive and reinforcing heuristics collectively form the “racial suspicion
heuristic,” which shapes behavior in the real world.
We translate this analysis to the higher-education context, where
socially salient stereotypes about Black intellectual inferiority are
particularly relevant. Grounded in Carbado and Roithmayr’s model, our
“elite student paradigm” goes one step further by integrating an additional
cognitive process: confirmation bias. Tracking the “black suspicion
paradigm,” our model begins with societal forces that create “racial lay
theories” in the domain of higher education.101 These racial lay theories
contain multiple components, each of which reinforces a collective
imagination that renders black students perpetual outsiders to the elite
institution. These components include: (a) racialized conceptions about the
prototypical student (white students) and (b) racial stereotypes concerning
intellectual capacity (lacking in black students). Individually and
collectively, these components create racialized understandings regarding
who belongs at, and who deserves to be at, elite institutions (white
students).102
97

See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 293, 296 (2012).
98
See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 8, at 153.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Prominent societal forces include “media representations, popular and political discourses, and
existing racial stratification . . . .” Id.
102
This model is stylized in ways that obscure important nuance. For instance, it would be
incomplete to suggest that the intersection of stereotypes, biases, and heuristics operate only vis-à-vis
white and black students. Asian students, as one additional example, often occupy a middle ground in
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These lay theories, in turn, produce a white-student-representativeness
heuristic (the prototypical student is white) and a white-student-availability
heuristic (white students belong at elite institutions). These distinct but
reinforcing heuristics center white students as the racial baseline and
marginalize black students as perpetual elite university outsiders who are
unable to enter on their own merit.
The elite student paradigm shapes real world behavior on multiple
fronts, within and outside the university. Within the university, black
students (and faculty)—regardless of the individual’s talents and
accolades—often confront a presumption of incompetence and
nonbelonging.103 As a result, particularly when severely underrepresented,104
black students are presumed to have received preferential treatment pursuant
to non-“meritocratic” admissions processes.105
Outside of the university, the elite student paradigm explains why
theories of Black inferiority—regardless of the underlying methods or
objective validity—gain greater traction in public discourse, the national
media, and the Supreme Court than do countervailing theories that explain
academic achievement gaps as the product of environmental contingencies
that uniquely burden students of color—even if predicated on decades of
social science.106
It is here that confirmation bias can help explain the tendency to defer
to, and mobilize, “evidence” that aligns with salient lay theories about race
in higher education. Recall that confirmation bias describes the tendency to
which “model minority” stereotypes situate Asians as intellectually talented (and therefore presumably
“deserving” of admission), yet Asians nonetheless remain racialized as perpetual foreigners to the
university (and the nation). See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
103
See Angela P. Harris & Carmen G. González, Introduction to PRESUMED INCOMPETENT 1, 1
(Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012).
104
See Deidre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning
Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1234 (2010). This result is, arguably, counterintuitive. If one
presumes that racial disparities are the product of market forces, the ability of someone from a severely
underrepresented group to access a competitive domain should signal unique talent and resilience.
Instead, the common interpretation is that the person was the beneficiary of preferential treatment.
105
In his Grutter dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the law school’s admission of black
students required a deviation from merit that occurred at the expense of more deserving white students.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 385–86 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Law School
cannot precisely control which of its admitted applicants decide to attend the university. But it can and,
as the numbers demonstrate, clearly does employ racial preferences in extending offers of admission.
Indeed, the ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School’s admissions program that the Court finds
appealing, appears to be, in practice, a carefully managed program designed to ensure proportionate
representation of applicants from selected minority groups.” (internal citations omitted)).
106
See, e.g., Dan Slater, Does Affirmative Action Do What It Should?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/opinion/sunday/does-affirmative-action-do-what-it-should.html
(discussing the emergence of “mismatch theory” in affirmative action debates) [https://perma.cc/M4MQ82SL].
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overvalue evidence that supports one’s underlying hypothesis and to
discount or reject countervailing evidence. Thus, a Justice (or lay observer)
who envisions the “typical” student in a way that tracks racial lay theories
informed by the elite student paradigm will search for and prioritize
information that confirms that, indeed, white students are inherently
deserving of admission and that black students are not. Should that individual
encounter evidence to the contrary, confirmation bias makes it more likely
that the information will be dismissed or otherwise subordinated in the
decision-making process.
The elite student paradigm can accordingly impact judicial adjudication
and institutional governance in the admissions context. Importantly, the elite
student paradigm’s explanatory power is not limited to situations in which a
judge, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Grutter dissent, mobilizes
descriptive statistics to support a claim of reverse racism.107 Even the Grutter
majority, for instance, treated race-conscious admissions as a deviation from
fundamental equality norms—albeit one necessary to achieve the compelling
interest of student body diversity.108
In this sense, although Grutter saved affirmative action in higher
education, it was arguably premised on a vision of the university that
centered and normalized Whiteness, while reinforcing the portrayal of black
students as institutional outsiders.
CONCLUSION
Although stylized, the “elite student paradigm” demonstrates how
deeply engrained stereotypes can operate as filters through which Justices
interpret evidence and engineer doctrine. For many, a natural next question
is how to mitigate these biases and heuristics in judicial decision-making.
To (begin to) answer this question, we turn to a lesson from a canonical
1978 study on confirmation bias by Mark Snyder and William B. Swann,
Jr.109 Among other things, Snyder and Swann wanted to test whether
incentives for better performance would mitigate the effects of confirmation

107
To be clear, we are not suggesting that confirmation bias was necessarily a causal factor in Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s disparate treatment of data in McCleskey and Grutter. Nonetheless, the social science
offers an evidence-based theory that helps explain, and in some sense harmonize, the Chief Justice’s
facially inconsistent treatment of data in these two cases.
108
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (“[R]acial classifications, however compelling their goals, are
potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands.
Enshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal
protection principle.”).
109
Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1209–10 (1978).
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bias.110 The incentives proved ineffective; even when prizes were offered,
participants continued to engage in a biased information search that
undermined performance.
We highlight this study not to concede that automatic cognitive
processes inevitably and insurmountably undermine genuinely equitable
judicial decision-making. Nonetheless, we find it useful to note that there is
likely no panacea and that debiasing remains more difficult than many
appreciate (even when we acknowledge our own fallibility).
That said, the social science provides valuable insights. At a minimum,
we should all openly recognize that regardless of any earnest commitment to
neutrality and objectivity, prevailing stereotypes, in conjunction with
prevalent biases and heuristics, render us all—even judges—more receptive
to evidence that aligns with lay theories regarding racial disparities and
discrimination. This means that judges may unknowingly give greater
deference to evidence of “reverse racism” than traditional discrimination
claims. Therefore, and assuming that judges should treat all statistical
evidence objectively and on the merits, executing equality may require
structural counterpreference strategies designed to mitigate an invisible
unevenness that, if unchecked, will predictably and systematically privilege
and reinforce the status quo and existing racial hierarchies in American
society.

110

Id.
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